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For Release on Delivery:

\v \
~tatement

ll

of Senator Mike M.an&field, (D. , Montana)

ES':'ABLISH A JCINT CC MMITTEC ON CENTRAL INTELL!GJ:NCE

Events during the past year have convincee me that an urgent need exists
for regular and responsiule congressional scrutiny of
Agercy.

th~

Central Intelligence

Such scrutiny is essential to the success of our foreign policy, to the

p1·ee;crvaHon of our democratic processes, and to the security of the Intelligence
Agency itself .

.

The sooner we provide a legislative framework for proper ;,.ov 1

Congrcsslonal-CIA relations, the quicker we c<>.n t-eg£n to build mutual confidence.
'fh!s is a prerequisite for effccti vc operation by an executive agency ,
especially one hidden behind <.:lased doors .

If we fail to eeta.blish some sort of

permanent, continuing link between Congress and the CIA the only re :.;ult will be
~ro·Ning

~y

suspicion .

From that, in all likelihood, will come sporadic investigations

•·c:.rious committcco of Congress .
It s!1ould not be surprising that a great many Members of Congress are

alre;.dy
~o

qu~stioning

the wisdom of continuing to a llow almost

a government agency as vital ar..d powerful a3 C!A.

compl ~te

independence

In the first place, the

whole concept of peacetime foreign intclli bencc oper-ations has be<::n alien to
American tradi!.iot•.
r.~tion

It was not untill947, when CIA was establisi1ed , that this

besan to devclor an intelligence service of a.r..y signii'i cant si2.e.

many harbored serious doubtc as to whether such an

or~a:1iza.t:!.on

Even then

belonged in a

democracy in peacetin.c.
Nevertheless, by 1947 most Americans raa!izcd that the United States
was confronted with a foe which would l!Se any means to attain its a i m , the conquest
of the ··,•orlc.

Information on the capabilities and intentions of aegressi·.re nationo
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th~;

became imperative, especially in view o f

developments in atomic enc:-gy.

The need for the Ccnti"al Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any
long e ::- <!.nd I certainly am not challenging it no·11 .

Wnat I arr. conce .-ned ':ith ,

howeve r, is C!A 1 s position of r esiJonsibility to none but
! believe this should be

Ccun•::il.

of othe:- major countries ope ra te

cb~n::;ed.
wi~Lout

It is ~..·uz

t~e

t:1~t

J'.Tatio.1al Security

intt•llic;cnce se:-vi:-cs

di:-ect cont!'ol oi thl'

is undcrstand:lble in a to talitanan governx.1ent, s:.1c!'- as

~

Gr ..!a~

Bt:tain where

part of and is respvnsible to Parli2.mc1:t.

of government , however, is

La~~'>d

system gets sc:dcu:::ly ou t of

b~.lanc~

on a

:;yst~m

of checi<s <!.nd J..,ai.ances .

at (;.:ly point

t~e

T!tis
It is

So·1ict Uuion,

l~1e

even under::>ta:1dable in a parliame1.ta:y cer.1ocracy, such a::>
the entire admin5 stt"a~~on is

lc~islatur cs .

Our fo::.·m
If

th~s

whole s:rstcm is jec?;::..;·dizcd

<nu the way is opened fo r t !-le a r owth of tyranny.
There has

b~.;en ~lmos t

no Congressional inspection of the C ... nt:al

Inte lligence Agency since the 1atter ' s establishment in 1947.

It is conceivable that

a:; the need fo r au intclligctJCe service had been C'lide!"'t i:1 19·~6 , t!'lc C.)ngressional
Reo:'(ianization Act cf tha t year would have made f!'Ovi .. ic ns for
participat;.on in the cor.;mittcc structur e of Congress .

congr~ssionat

As it is now, howeve.:,

C1.A is freed from pra :tically every urcHn<t::-y forM of Cong1 cssic•nal d eel< .
Of itS expen.:'itU!'eS is exempted f r o:n the provisiOnS of law
abuses it•
to

ot~~=

oth~r

goverr.rr.ent

ager.c~es.

V.}li~h

fL'CVCf,t f:nr 'lcial

Its appropriat'or.s o._·e hicl•le::1

ifl

a€en=ie::: , <ln:i the bureau of the Budget does not :-.,pur ... CiA' c;

strength

~o

even l:'le

Z.}-FtOp..L:atic;,;~

Cor:g::ess.

Ea~h

Cvntrol

a llot.nents

per~:;onncl

year or.ly a h<..r.ciul of Ivi:emLcrs i:1 e::Lch house see

I1gur•.:J .

There

~s

r.o rezul::l1, rr.c t!1odical revic·..v of thie
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agenc.y, other than a briefing Nhich is supplied to a few members of the appropri ations com.nittec s.
I ;.g:rec that an
efiective.
woul.~

L1tel~igerce

ag"!ncy must maint:a.in C":Orr.plete

qniddy dry up .

in~elligencc

example is tr.e
and

d~cipher

Not only would tr..e flov.' of L1fOj,'tna t!.on be cut oif , but the

l o~t

product wo!!ld be
brealdn~

importa:1t

wa:-e of our knowledge .

of a code .
rncssa~es

In add;ti >n, much of the value of

if it were known that \ve possessed it .

If we b:-ealc a code we can contim:.e to

as long as the enemy o r. potential

However, the instu.nt the E'nemy

l~a:;:ns

pur~)oses

An

intercep~

~nemy

is una -

that v:e have the

'-·ey, they w ill stop using that code or possibly t.se it only to mislead us .
br t!lese

to be

If clandestine sources of info rmation we:-e inadvertently revealed, they

live3 of many would be seriously enda.ntiered.
the

~ecrecy

Secrecy

is obvious ly n eces sa:::y.

However, there is a profou.od tlifference between an essenti?.1 dcg:-ee of
sen ecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy fo:- the mere sake of secrecy .
Once secrecy

b~comes

sacrosar ct, it iuv:.tes

abu~~.- .

If v1c accept this idea of

secrecy for secrecy ' s sake we will have no way of l<t•ow!ng whether we have a fine
btelligencc service or a very poor one.
Sccrecv now beclouds everythir.g a'.Jout CIA -- :. ... 3 cost, its efficiency ,
~ts

s·Jcccsses, ar.d its failures .

It bas been

pocc.ls regarding CIA by Members 0£
gently fo:- this <:!.gcncy
correct.

bccau~e

rnustc~:ed

Cor:g~:ess .

we !1ave no

agabst ques•ious or ::,...-o-

It ~s d!ff:.~..1lt to :egis1a~e irtelli -

info~r.nat~on

wh:ch we can be positive is
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An aur a of superiority has been built a ::- ound the CIA.
vestigation oi CI.,. pe:-oonncl have been met
any

o::~1er

agency .

·.v~t!'\

Calls for an in -

a resistance not t•nco.:.ntcrcd !rom

The Adn.inistrat.ion <:tp?ears to su:;po't't the

vi~w tha~

CIA

oificia!s me::-it an imml!nity which ho s ne·1cr bcc'1 cl.:timed for t!1c State Depa r tment
or

o~hr:: gov~ r nment

agenr:ics hand!ing equal:y co fidnnt\G.l

to have rr.a r l·ed 0ut fc::
and

~he

i~self

mate r i~l.

C I A seems

a oetting abo\'c ot!-Jc r government agcrcics, Congress,

?Ub l ic .
I do not believe that

res:_:>ons~blc

Congrenional G.l!ciitin; of the CIA is

incom?atible with the mainten.1.nce of the degr ee of sec r ecy nc.cescary to the
o;>era t ioo~s

legiti:nate

would p::otcc t the
:-n~l-:\!

of t!iis agency .

r eputat~or.

of

GH~

On the cont1·a r 1 it has mar.y adv.Jntages .

agency aga:nst unjustified

a~.'acks.

It

E would

unnecessary ::;poracic inv estigati0ns wr.ich noight leac to t::1aut!:o1izcd c:s -

closur es .

AdeC!ua t e funds wo.1!d be assured fo r a ll legitimate pur!>oses .

~mpcrtart ,

••~ r eat to

Most

the asse r tion of Cor g r essional interest in this field would r edu.:e toe

O'.lr c.krr.ocra.~ic

natu-re now

p r ocesses vthich this uncontl"o lled

agepc~r

by its v ery

pos~s .

'!'he kine of Cone r essional role wl.ich is called fo r in this situa tion is
:::h1ilc:!.: to th:1.!: p!<iyed by the .;oint Ccmmittec on P.to de

Ea ·~ q;y .

1hc resolution

which I a m intr oducing today is similar to one I S?on::;o r ed laDt J .1ly.
the

c;.·~..:~t:,.o ~1

o: a Joi 1t Committee on Central

be cor:.posec! of five members of the
mo ::- e than th r ee membe r s i.1 either
?a r ~y .

'!hr.

Commi!.~ec

s~nate
ho·.1s~

l:ltellig0 I~ce.

Jt p::-opo::;zs

This Committee wvuld

:J.nd five memb ... ~s of the

I!ous~ .

_To

would be selected from the same politicat

would mak3 CJ:,tinuing st ...h ..ties of

t!l~ activiti~s

of th-a

f..g~ncy ,
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its problems, its utilization by other departments and agencies, and its
coordinatio>1 with them.

From time to time the u.embers of the committee would

report to the Senate and Ho:..1se and recommend such

l egi~latlon

as might be needed .

'!"ile Joint Committee on Atomic Energy offers a model io:: Congr essional
part.i.c:::>ation in the control of CIA .

The Joint Cor.-ur.ittee deals with a subject that

requires at least as much secrecy as woul d a committee 0'1 intelligence.
e~~

V!ith a subject that is even more vital

~o

our national

Tl:e Atomic Energy Committee i::as earned the
~xccutive

and Legislative B.ranc!1es v£ the g0vernment .

:he most vital

s~crets

;~.ffccting

sec~ri!.y .

r~spect

It h2s

of

bo.~1

bc~n

Their

the

ent1·usted with

o£ state and it :1as proved worthy of that trust .

b-::rs of Conercss have full confidence i-l its judgment .

It

Other roem -

leg~sbtbt> act~ons

at0rr.ic enertff are based on the secure knowled:se that truDted membc r o

of both hc.u.ses are fully cognizant of developments in atomic enc:;.·gy .

They do not

have to depend on the unilateral jud3rnent of the F.;yprative B'l'c-nch as to wha t
ncmbers of

Co1~0ress ou~ht

or ought :oo!: to l<now .

The ;\_tomic Energy Commission also benefit:; from its ties with the
Cvmmittee

bec~use

it provid-JR the Commjssione r s with a clear char.nel into which

t:1ey can cii::ect t!1ei!" legis l ative p!"oblerr:s .
orogram ,

r<10!'eov~r ,

The security of i:l1e Atomic Energy

is not pe r iodically t:h=: eatencd by sporadic

irvesti~;2::c.1z

anc tml:.::.rrassing questions from the floor of Cong!'ess .

! ao not believe tl:at the Ce;1tral I.1t.elligeuce Agenc'/ enjoys the s3.me

degree of

conf~:l.erce

:.n

Contiress 2nd <lmong the American people which has been

gaine<! b 1 t:1e Atomic E:1e r gy Commission.

And I do not believe tna CIA will eve r
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obtain it under present ar;anger..er.ts.
steady loss of

c~nfidcnce.

about the efficiency and

How

r

econvU~y

uld it be

t~1c

contrary, a:l signs point to a

o~herwisc

":1en we arc left to wonder

o! its opc!"alion, if the oniy assurances we have

of the eHcctiv"!ncss vf tl.e service are those

proffer~J

by the men who r un it?

Until a committee of t 11e kind I am proposing is established, there will
be no way of l<nowir.g what serious flaws in the Intellir;;cncc Acency may be covered
by t:1e cul'tain of cecrecy in "·'hich it is shrouded.
·~xar.1.incd

the CIA.

rhe

1')~9

1.he Hoover Commiss'on

A task force stated that "The Central lntcllige!lcc

not yet achieved tl'e
Wi~!1out

:in

desir~c

A~en::y

has

degree of proficiency and cicpenoaLility in its estimates

it, the National Secur ity Cour.cil cannot succeed in a"::sessing and appraisinf

objectiv~s,

commitments, ancl !'ic;l• s of the Ur.ited Stc.o.tes in

rnH!ta r y power , with sufficient continuity or <Jefir.iteness to

rel~L:0:1

constitut~

to cur . . .

a p:;.·actical

gt:ide to the milita ry e.,tablishment as to the size of our r,;ilitary nccus," It recommended that v.i.gorous steps l.H' taken to improve t be
its

Centr~ 1

lntelligPnce Agenc-y and

wo:;.·l~.

H;J.ve
findi£1g out.
quest~on

thes~

steps been taken?

'.Ve do nvt knO\J and we !1ave no way of

·!et we are adc:.:!d to go on appropriating vast funds

w~thout

debate or

for this agency .
Mo1·e recently the Wash:.ngton Star carried a story to

~he

ct!'cc!

t!-.a~

C:\ "llu::i become so top heavy and unwieldy that itch( u:d be sc:::apped altogctl er
and

rep!ace~

reported this
Le muc:1

by a
v~ew

:;~w

orgamzation. "

Is this charge

tru~?

The

co:~mr.ist

who

said further that "our legislators feel strongi.y that there must

ov~rlapping

a.nd usdess cxpcntlit1Jre in t!1e activities" of the five separate
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groups engaged in intelligence -- CIA, the State Department, the Navy, the Army ,
and the Air Force .

Is this charge true?

He also wrote that "le&isla.tors who have

been in close contact with the CIA believe that there is much dead wood in the
organization which should be elimi:lated and it contains too n1any 'pals' of men with
in~ '.H'nce

in the Government. 11 !s this charge true?
The fact is that we do not know whether these and other charges similarly

unrelated to secrecy are ti:ue or not true.
agt>ilCy, We oueht

~0

And if we are to legislate funds for

know,

V!e also do n()t kn()w if CIA. is staying
law or if it haa

t~\is

ex:panc~ed

wi~hin

beyond its originc..l purposes.

the litnits establiched by
Cn Decembe..- 30, 1952, the

r.ctme colurr.nist asserted that "the CIA established an intelligence service in t!le

U:1itcd States,

11

altho•1f,h the law creatine t!1P. Agency speciGcally p:!'ohibits it from

"police, s..1bpena, law - enforcement powers or :nterr.<i.l-security funct.i.o:1s.

1

'

Yet,

as vtas pointed out in an article in the New Y{)rk Times on July 19 , 1953, two CIA
agents Gave reports to
country.

t~1e

FBI that Owen Lattimo:::-e was abt)Ut to leave thi3

Nevertheless, they later refused on security grounds to

on their role in

~r.:s

matter.

t~Etify

in coul't

Does this incident mean that the CIA b getting into

::':le i:r.ternal secu:-ity field in competition v1ith the FBI?

Docs it mean that officials

of t!1is government ager.cy can defy the ccurts?
\V~'lat

of the quality of the pro<lcct v1hich CIA is produclnjj?

CIA

officials cl<:!m that the Unite:! Statzs btcliiee:1ce oys~em ~s r,~cond o:1!y :o that of
t!le Soviet Union.
of wea!G1ess.

I do not know whe!her this is a boast of

r~a;l~On Daldn~n

stre;l~th

or a confession

has rer.>ol ted that some obl3ervers believe that it ia
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actually not as effective, in terms of end re sults, as the British Secret Service
w~th

roughly 3, 000 emplcyec:s or the Israeli service with roughly 300.

Others

believe that tbis country is spending too much money on intelligen::e for the
results we a re obtaining.
of

th~

The amount is a classifieu fi&nre but publiahed estimates

anr.ual appropr:atior. run from $500 million to $300 million.

Personnel

estimates in the press xun between 8, 000 and 3:), 000 er:"ployees .
Whatcve.,_·

~he

cort

w~

ought to be cer tai.1 of

t~e

quality of our intelligence.

Fault~r

intelli r;ence estimates could jeopardize our entire defense "'nd ou:- fo:-ci gn

po~~<"Y.

Both of these must be based on cold knowledge and i:'\tcllige ..... t '!valuatio::l

of

t}·e

capabilit:eG and intentions of other co1mtrien.

it is logical to assume

t!-•:l.t

I£ o..1r premises are wro::1g,

the policies based upon them will be wrong.

The Central Intellige:1ce A&cncy plays a more direct role in foreiGn
policy than that of simply providing some of the information on
are baaed .

It also serves,

apparen~ly ,

w~ich

as an instrument of polic7.

our policies

Time maga-

zine recently rep0rted i:il...t "Tho..:gh ClA off:cic::l& do .1ot adn1it H pu!.>l.i.ct·1 the
::tgency was hom the start engaged in a wida :..·angc of 'covert
aid to resistant:c movements and perhaps sabotage . "
kind

o~

activities are carriC'd 0::1, I do not k::1ow.

tio::l is even more closely guarded.
b~en rep~:-tecl

activit~cc ',

Exactly how m"'.ny and what

Tl':.iz is a held in which info r ma-

Nevertheless, se·;eral such

in the press and we can

ass~me

espionage,

actjvi~ies

hc>.ve

that there ha"e bee:1 others which

have r.ot made the headlines .
In the

W~shington

Post of January 9, 1953, the follow:ng undertakings

o! C!A agents were cited a.s a "sampling of exploits which have bet!n the scbjcct of
many whispered complaints. 11
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"1.

Subsidiza doz1 by CIA of a neo - Nazi organization v,hich
had marked fo1· liquiC.at~un the leaders c! the SocLl
Democ1::~tit: n". ~Y· /-;-__'he party o! E-·ret Reuter, late
mayor of 3cl :.m s.nd -;ehetn~nt anti - Co.'l" .1a='' :-y}.

2.

lrc":-cer ·..:~ion

f')r. eight mo'lths of Japar~se citize:1
~.:rder cxcu.;e of cross -~:-.:amination - - a job ini!:1a~!y
1.m6-ertaken ty General V/iHou.e,bby' s A..rrr.y Intel~:Ge1.ce
an::l r~a ~sed ot! to CIP. •

"'•

.,

I'-.

1.

Abo":tive er:ort bf CIA u ... ~~t~over ..i"'3:1 ~o st<~rt a r(..•·0lutiot• i.1 Gu<:.tcrr.ala a""ld b'arr.c. it on t!·c Ut!ited F1 u.t
Co.

5.

B-.!::-rr.ese c:.t.d Siamese

"
. .,
,,.,.... .
.
1c:pp1ng o ~~.e te 1epllOr.e
c1 ... cse ~:.guerc..;, !o:t:'tnc::Co';~a R'ca.n President /-;_•Hl new P::es'!.t::~·.-.t aga;n/, at
. . a c ...u"'\.1\ m~.n was ca~g
'.J •
wn.cn
.t re ....
- .1and tc•. .
•

,

\.

:.'l.!lj V:.etn<:.mese sus;:ncions o!
CIA activity i '1 pi."cr.-.o.~!'~ g;te:::il~a ~or<J.·;s !rom the
B·.nmc::~ i::ol ...l\!:c !"lto l~~ai:"ll:lnd Ci1ina on tl:e !'art o!
th~ ~att<>r cem::'ion e·:!.~t:~e$ among C ,iG..ni£ K~.i-:;h~ 1 "

CCf~atC,: ~!ati~r.alistS,

! clv

col!ld

h;~.•.·c

no~ n~cc'

uetwef'n C!A fClicy and

Ur.i•c~

lm~)act

w!lic!1 t'i.1is sort of activity

Of .er co;.1ntr:es cannot be

States

s

II

to point cut the tremendous

en Oi.'.:." fore,;,gn policy .

1

po~ic).

e::pec.~ed

to d1sti11t:;dsl.

lf. these reports nre true =hen it

wol!ld appear to others that it was United States fo,·dgn policy to promote a neo Nazi Ol.(;G..nizatio!1, to incarcerate a Japanese citizen , an<i stc:.rt a re•,olction in onz
o: our neitil:borir.3 coul'). •.:-ies.

Mo!'E.over,

t!l~

Bur.na episode, according to the

Wasl1!ngto:1 P:-s:, "led t"> the resignadon in disgust of O':'le
rcsrcccca of cu:- career AIT:bassacors on

Is there any
trol ovc::.-

w:>n~er

that

!?\i~ ag~ncy?

~here

~~-.e

g:;,·:>und

r.o~

o~

or.ly

the

::,cs~

~!l:t~

and most

he <lici nu!: go

shodd be it"creasi;->g concer:1 w1.t!1 2he absence of cor. -

VIe car..noi: p;;l'mit

C~!.

any mo:-e

!~ar. ~~:1>· <"t:~e~

go·.rexnr:1ent

- !0 -

~nywhe: c

agency to have !1·ee reign to do anythinti it wa:1ts

in the wo:;:ld.

If its

agents play care!essly v:it.!'l f.i. ...·e, th(! ·.-,ho1c v:orld :rig:.t get '!:>·.1::1cu.
I <lo not :1ilve ofHcH:.l
~.s

All my i.,form:l'ic.n,

tioned.

we wonl<! r.ot know the !.let&.

veri!~cat:.on

T~.at

rhc

com~~:r.y

~heir

lips anti put on tbe

is

\Vot;i.d

i~·

n~o::e

not t.c fa1

~·.!rSl!Cd b~·

reaso~a !::l:,

gr.~ting

~"'r itic.is~s:

•. cnsiblc ::.J. Cor.t,tess wcte

<:cnt::"<!l !ntc!li::;e"'ce? !s there a:1y

cer t.-.;:1 ti·c:.c put:L<" .funu3 r:..:e r't

fa,~e

of mr>.:"'ty:::-Jorn , c•;e r y time tl ey wet•e- crit:cizc';.

chanue~

to

p:.-~sent

the!r sjcie .

'I'i:e

w:;tho•..~t

:oss o f

Until we c::-catc some so r t of watchciog conJJ.liltee , however , we wHl

have nothing i.>t:
wi':!esp!'ea<l

..:ontii~ut:C.

<.•ll;ticty about

t:l~ Ce:1~r::tl

i11telligencc Agen .... , and its

activi.~ies.

It is charactr>ristic of our s ystc.: n1 of govl'rnmcnt
a:-.d rightty sc 1 of ur.:·estr<:'ine! power .
13rancl~ <.>.J

Co"l::>tit'-ltion.
ment.::.!

T!ley

joi~1t coro~:'llittcc,

in ';nrn, could r.,--..i•lta:n the cc nfiden('e of Cong:;,·<'s!i and the ruLli1;,

tive

bci~6 ,.,~sted?

the inte1ligE.11..C it necd3 f:.n· itn ."'l'Ctcction?

wou:u have a Congr.'!sr.ic. ::tl
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